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I estimate the cyclicality of Italian real wages over the period 1985-2003 controlling
for the so-called ￿composition bias￿ . Aggregate real wage statistics, commonly used to
measure real wage elasticity, are a⁄ected by the bias arising from the cyclical change in
the skill-composition of the labor force. An analysis on WHIP longitudinal data shows
that the degree of Italian real wage procyclicality signi￿cantly increases after controlling
for composition bias: this result is robust to several checks and it is consistent with Solon,
Barsky and Parker￿ s 1994 seminal paper on the US. Finally, I discuss the e⁄ects of the
the 90￿ s labor market￿ s reforms on Italian real wage cyclicality.
1 INTRODUCTION
The goal of this work is to shed new light on real wage behavior over the business cycle in
order to contribute to answer a very debated question in the economic literature: are real
wages acyclical or procyclical over the business cycle?
The weak cyclicality showed by aggregate real wage statistics has been considered by the
literature a salient feature of the business cycle. In the well-known work ￿Business Cycle
Fluctuations in U.S. Macroeconomic Time Series￿(1998), Stock and Watson found that real
wages in the US. were weakly procyclical over the period 1947-1996 and weakly volatile, while
employment - in terms of worked hours - was highly procyclical and had the same variability
shown by the output.
Thus, real wages￿weak cyclicality and employment￿ s high procyclicality were considered
stylized facts of labor market. In order to explain them, macroeconomists set up theoretical
models in which employment ￿ uctuations were the result of shifts of labor demand curve
along a stable and highly elastic short-run labor supply curve, i.e. e¢ ciency-wage models,
insider-outsider models or implicit contracts models. In these models, only an highly elastic
short-run labor supply curve could conjugate the weak procyclicality shown by real wages with
employment￿ s high procyclicality. But an highly elastic labor supply is in contraddiction with
the majority of microeconomic evidence, pointing to a quite rigid labor supply, expecially for
the male component of the labor force.
￿This research has been supported by Fondazione CRT (Progetto Al￿eri Grant) and by the University of
Torino. The author is grateful for the excellent advices of Lia Pacelli and Bruno Contini and of the seminar
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1Beside those theories that predict acyclical real wages, there are theories that predict
that real wages are actually procyclical over the business cycle: employment ￿ uctuations are
described as the result of shifts of labor demand curve along a positively sloped short-run
labor supply curve. Labor demand shifts could be caused by productivity shocks (e.g. real
business cycle models) or nominal disturbances (e.g. Keynesian models). The hypothesis of
procyclical real wages has important implications on short-run labor supply￿ s elasticity: if
real wages are actually procyclical over the business cycle, there is no need for short-run labor
supply curve to be highly elastic afterall. This would con￿rm the micro-level results.
An explanation can be found in Stockman (1983). He proved that aggregate real wage
statistics - commonly used in the aggregate time series - show weak procyclicality over the
business cycle because of a statistical bias. In particular, real wage aggregate statistics are
constructed in a way that gives greater weight to low-skill workers during expansions than dur-
ing recessions. So they exhibit a "composition bias" that would obscure - in a countercyclical
direction - the true real wage procyclical behavior, as I discuss in Section 2.
Composition bias has been analyzed by many empirical studies, e.g. Bils (1985), Mitchell,
Wallace and Warner (1985), Solon, Barsky and Parker (1994). The majority of these studies
following the strategy proposed by Stockman found strong evidence of real wage procyclicality.
My aim is to analyze the behavior of Italian real wages over the business cycle by con-
trolling for such a composition bias. Following the econometric strategy proposed by Solon,
Barsky and Parker (1994), I estimate the cyclicality of Italian real weekly wages over the
1985-2003 period using longitudinal data from WHIP, the most suitable dataset for this kind
of analysis (data issues are discussed in Section 4). I ￿nd that Italian real weekly wages
are procyclical and their degree of procyclicality signi￿cantly increases once I control for the
composition bias, suggesting that the aggregate real weekly wage statistics are contaminated
by a downward bias. This ￿nding - supported by several robustness checks - is consistent
with Solon et al.(1994)￿ s results for the US. Despite the high procyclicality shown over the
1985-2003 period, Italian real wage response to business cycle ￿ uctuations experiences a slight
decline after 1997, due to the e⁄ects brought by the 90￿ s labor market reforms.
In Section 2, I review the "composition bias" issue. Section 3 focuses on the econometric
strategy I use to estimate Italian real wage cyclicality. Data, descriptive statistics and the
sample selection procedure are presented in Section 4. Section 5 reports the estimation results
- whose robustness is checked in Section 6 - and the comparison to the US. Section 7 focuses
on the e⁄ects of the 90￿ s labor market reforms on the cyclicality of Italian real wages. Finally,
Section 8 discusses the main results and their implications and it concludes.
22 COMPOSITION BIAS
As pointed out by Stockman in 1983, the true procyclicality of real wages is obscured in
aggregate time series because of a composition bias: to explain the point, I follow Solon et
al.(1994). The aggregate wage statistics are constructed in a way that gives greater weight to
low-skill workers during expansions than during recessions. In fact, the aggregate hourly real
wage statistics are computed as the ratio of "total wage bill Bt" at time t, and "total work
hours Ht". Suppose that workers are "divided into J groups, with j = 1;2;:::;J, with Bjt



















with j = 1;:::;J (1)
Equation (1) shows that "the aggregate wage statistic is a weighted average of the group-
speci￿c wage statistics with the groups weighted by their hour shares".
If such aggregate average earnings are used to measure real wage cyclicality over the
business cycle, one is implicitly assuming that the labor force composition stays constant over
the business cycle. But this clearly does not happen. In fact, labor force composition - by
age, sex and race - varies considerably with the business cycle. In particular, groups￿hour
shares vary with the business cycle. Several empirical studies1 showed that work hours of low-
wage groups (such as youth, black and less educated workers) are "more cyclically variable
than those of high-wage groups". Thus, "the aggregate wage statistics give greater weight to
low-skill workers during expansions than during recessions".
For instance2, suppose that ￿rms tend to lay o⁄ lower-skilled and/or less senior workers
during the recession phases of the business cycle and to retain workers who are - on average -
older/more skilled than the ￿red ones. The result is that the quality of the workers who are
still employed will tend to increase. So, the average aggregate real wage will increase because
of the exclusion of less-skilled groups from the labor force, even if no increase in the real
wage per worker has occured. Viceversa, during an expansion, the distribution of the labor
force shifts towards unskilled/younger groups of workers, causing a decrease in the average
real wage aggregate statistic, even if no worker had actually faced a cut in his wage. This
induces a countercyclical composition bias. In conclusion, if this kind of statistics are used to
estimate real wages cyclicality over the business cycle, the true procyclicality that the typical
worker of each group actually faces will be underestimated.
Let￿ s consider the cyclical variation in the aggregate wage statistic with respect to a cycle




















1Kosters and Welch (1972), Okun (1973), Clark and Summers (1981), Mitchell, Wallace and Warner (1985)
and Kydland (1984).
2Mitchell, Wallace and Warner (1985).
3The resulting measure of the aggregate real wage cyclicality is a "weighted average of the
cyclical wage changes experienced by the J groups" (the component that re￿ ects the true wage
cyclicality) "plus a second term re￿ecting the cyclical change in the skill composition of total
work hours". This last term represents the composition bias: "if groups with low relative wages
Wjt=Wt have procyclical hour shares, the second term contributes a countercyclical bias".
How could the composition bias be corrected? Given that the measurement problem in
aggregate wage data is caused by the cyclically shifting weights, a solution is to construct
a wage statistic that gives ￿xed weights to the exact same workers over time. By following
the same workers with ￿xed weights over time, labor force composition can be held constant
over the business cycle. To do so, one needs to use longitudinal micro-level data. This is the
strategy followed by Solon et al.(1994) to estimate US. real hourly wage cyclicality over the
1967-1987 period. They ￿nd that after controlling for composition bias, US. real wages are
actually highly procyclical, though aggregate real wage statistics have revealed - for the same
period - weak procyclicality.
Men and Women
Solon et al.(1994) estimate a di⁄erent real wage cyclicality for men and women, hence the
aggregate real wage statistics are biased not only because of the composition bias described
so far, but also because of the aggregation of women and men. Formally, let f and m denote
women and men. Let ￿3m and ￿3f be "the true wage cyclicalities for men and women" and
let ￿ be "the proportional gap between wages paid for cyclically marginal hours of work and
wages paid for nonmarginal hours". "If, within each gender, the cyclically marginal hours are














































Equation (3) shows that "the cyclicality of aggregate wage statistic is approximately a
weighted average of the true cyclicalities of men￿ s and women￿ s wages plus two composition
bias terms. The ￿rst of these re￿ects cyclical variation in the gender composition of total work
hours. The second re￿ects cyclical variation in the skill composition of each gender￿ s hours".
If women are paid less than men and have less cyclically variable hours, the gender com-
position term by itself imposes a procyclical bias, while the skill composition bias from the
last term is countercyclical (since ￿ < 0). This is what Solon et al.(1994) found for US. data.
In particular, they found that the procyclical gender composition bias is smaller than the
countercyclical bias due to the last term - since the gender di⁄erence in hours cyclicality is
not very large. Therefore, the resulting aggregate wage statistics turn out to be downward
biased. Moreover, Solon et al.(1994) found that real wages are less procyclical for women than
for men, meaning that
￿ ￿￿3f
￿ ￿ < j￿3mj, though the estimates for women are not statistically
signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero.
3All proofs in Solon et al.(1994).
43 ECONOMETRIC STRATEGY
To estimate Italian real wage cyclicality over the 1985-2003 period, I use the econometric
strategy proposed by Solon et al.(1994). In particular, the following statistical model for
characterizing the cyclicality in aggregate real wage data is used:
lnWt = ￿1 + ￿2t + ￿3t2 + ￿4
￿
Yt ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿2t ￿ ￿3t2￿
+ "t (4)
where Wt is the aggregate real wage statistic in year t, Yt is real GDP - as business cycle
indicator - and "t is a random error term. In particular, the wage measure I use in my analysis,
Wt, is the real weekly wage, since long longitudinal data on hourly wages are not available in
Italy. The implication of using weekly instead of hourly wage is discussed in the next section.
In order to analyze the cyclical components of wage and real GDP changes, a quadratic
temporal trend is included in equation (4), and the business cycle indicator is expressed as
a deviation from its own quadratic trend. Since "t is typically highly serially correlated and
non stationary, by ￿rst-di⁄erentiating equation (4) one gets:
￿lnWt = ￿1 + ￿2t + ￿3￿lnYt + vt (5)
where:
vt =￿"t
￿1 =￿2 ￿ ￿3 + ￿4 (￿3 ￿ ￿2)
￿2 =2(￿3 ￿ ￿4￿3)
￿3 =￿4
Equation (5) is estimated with ordinary least squares (OLS), so that b ￿3 is the OLS estimate
of the cyclicality of Wt with respect to the business cycle indicator: b ￿3 > 0 if Wt is procyclical,
b ￿3 = 0 if Wt is acyclical and b ￿3 < 0 if Wt is countercyclical. In the ￿rst phase of the analysis
- the unbalanced sample - ￿lnWt is constructed by computing the log of the average real
wage in year t, while in the second phase of the analysis, the dependent variable ￿lnWt is
instead computed using the sample mean of the log real wage in year t among the workers of
the balanced sample4. Results from OLS estimation of equation (5) are presented in Section
5, after data issues are discussed in the next section.
4As in Solon et al.(1994) for comparability.
54 DATA AND SAMPLE SELECTION
4.1 DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Business Cycle Indicator
The indicator of the stage of the business cycle I use is GDP at 2000 constant prices, as
provided by Istat (Conti Nazionali 2008). Actually, Solon et al.(1994) use three di⁄erent busi-
ness cycle indicators to estimate real hourly wage cyclicality for the US.: the unemployment
rate, real GNP (de￿ ated by GNP implicit de￿ ator) and per-capita hours of work (computed
as the product of the employment/population ratio and the average annual work hours of the
employed). This because the three indicators are highly correlated in the US. Figure 1 shows
the three US. cycle indicators (in growth rates) from 1967 to 1987, i.e. the period analyzed by
Solon et al.(1994). As one can notice from the graphs, the changes in the unemployment rate
are highly negatively correlated with the GDP growth rate: the correlation coe¢ cient between
the two growth rates, ￿, is in fact equal to ￿0:86. Per-capita hours of work shows a strong
positive contemporaneous correlation with the output (￿ = 0:89). Now, let￿ s look at Figure 2
- that depicts the three cycle indicators (in growth rates) over the 1985-2003 period in Italy.
Di⁄erently from the US., Italian unemployment rate and per-capita hours of work5 are weakly
correlated with the output, with ￿ = ￿0:13 and ￿ = 0:35, respectively. An explanation for
this divergence can be found in institutional di⁄erences between the two countries, as several
institutional constraints in￿ uence Italian change in unemployment and worked hours, such as
employment protection laws and restrictions to overtime use. Thus, real GDP turns out to
be a more proper indicator of the business cycle.
5Computed as in Solon et al.(1994). Source for both: Istat.






































1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Year
Changes in Unemployment Rate Per-capita Hours of Work Growth Rate
GDP Growth Rate
Business Cycle Indicators Fluctuations, Usa (1967-1987)
Source: Economic Report of the President 2009, Table B-2, B-3, B-32, B-36, B-39,B-42.






































1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
Changes in Unemployment Rate Per-capita Hours of Work Growth Rate
GDP Growth Rate
Business Cycle Indicators Fluctuations, Italy (1985-2003)
Source: Conti Nazionali 2008 and Le ore lavorate per la produzione del Pil, Istat, 2008.
7Wages from WHIP
The analysis of Italian real wage cyclicality for the 1985-2003 period is based on panel
data WHIP (Work Histories Italian Panel), an administrative dataset with information on
the weekly wages of a large sample of Italian employees (about 100,000 yearly observations)
in private ￿rms. WHIP data include information not only about a certain number of char-
acteristics of each worker (such as his/her annual labor income, work days and work weeks,
gender, year of birth, geographical region where she/he works, work start/end dates, job
quali￿cation) but also about the ￿rm where he/she works (such as industry and size). As
the actual number of hours worked by an employee is not observable in WHIP, hourly wages
cannot be computed. The number of "work days" and "work weeks" of each employee in each
job spells and his/her total remuneration (before taxes) are however known, which allows us
to compute the employee￿ s daily (weekly) wage as the ratio of worker￿ s annual remuneration
and his/her worked days (weeks). Notice that this wage measure includes overtime work.
Alternative datasets that record Italian hourly wages are EU-SILC/ECHP and SHIW
(Bank of Italy): both have shorter and more discontinuous longitudinal dimension and are
not suitable for this kind of analysis. Moreover, WHIP data on wages are more reliable,
as they are drawn from administrative archives. To the best of my knowledge, Italian real
wage response to business cycle ￿ uctuations is studied only by Peng and Siebert (2006),
who use ECHP data to analyze Italian male real wage cyclicality over the 1994-2001 period,
distinguishing between job-stayers and movers and between Northern and Southern Italy.
The wage measure I use in my analysis is the real weekly wage, de￿ ated by the consumer
price index "Indice nazionale dei prezzi al consumo per l￿ intera collettivit￿" (NIC senza tabac-
chi), a monthly price index that refers to the generality of consumption of domestic households,
elaborated by Istat6. The main reason for not choosing real daily wage as a wage measure
is the belief that the estimate of real wage cyclicality could turn out to be biased. In fact,
Contini, Filippi and Malpede (2000) observed that in the South of Italy, employers report a
number of working days which is lower than the actual one - to the national social security
archives (INPS). This Southern ￿rms behavior leads to overestimate the resulting daily wage
measure, with an higher overestimation during recessions than during booms.
The implication of using weekly instead of daily wages is that real weekly wages are
expected to be more procyclical than daily wages: the reason can be found in the way they
are computed. In fact, assuming that yearly earnings are held constant, it happens that work
days vary more than work weeks over the business cycle. As real daily wages are constructed
by dividing annual labor income by total worked days, it means that the denominator of daily
wage statistic ￿ uctuates more than the weekly wage￿ s one - the numerator being constant. For
the same reason real weekly wages are expected to be more procyclical than real hourly wages
over the cycle. However, when I use real daily wage as alternative wage measure to check
6In Solon et al.(1994) real hourly wages are de￿ ated by using the GNP implicit de￿ ator. In my analysis,
Italian real wages are de￿ ated by using the CPI (NIC) instead of the GDP implicit de￿ ator. By de￿nition, the
CPI re￿ ects the prices of a representative basket of goods and services purchased by the consumers, whereas
the GDP de￿ ator re￿ ects prices of all goods and services produced within the country. Since the ratio between
the value of imports as a percentage of total domestic demand in Italy is double (about 11% ) than in the US
(about 6%, source: OECD I-O tables) and since the 70% of the NIC basket is represented by items associated
to sectors with higher exposure to international trade, the CPI represents a more proper de￿ ator for Italian
prices than the GDP de￿ ator.
8the robustness of the results7, the cyclicality shown by daily wages does not statistically
signi￿cantly di⁄er from that of weekly wages: because of the high correlation coe¢ cient
between work days and weeks, they show nearly coincident growth rates over the 1985-2003
period.
Figures 3 to 8 show WHIP weekly wage￿ s sample averages by worker￿ s age, gender, job
quali￿cation, geographical area, ￿rm size and sector over the 1985-2003 period. Some regu-
larities come out: in particular, real weekly wages are - on average - higher for men and for
older workers; moreover, people who work in North-Western regions, in ￿rms with more than
1,000 employees, and in service sectors earn more.
In each ￿gure real GDP growth rate is reported, so that it is also possible to comment
the cyclical behavior of real weekly wages over the period. After classifying workers by age,
gender, job quali￿cation, geographical area, ￿rm￿ s size and sector, no di⁄erences are visible
in weekly wage cyclicality across groups. However, I will control for gender di⁄erences that
might emerge, as discussed in Section 2, to let the data indicate whether they are relevant.
In general, real weekly wages seem to be quite procyclical over the 1985-2003 period, though
after 1993-94 the wage dynamics seem to be ￿ atter than GDP￿ s.
7In order to compare the two wage measures, the South of Italy is excluded from the sample to avoid
potential measurement error, according to Contini, Filippi and Malpede (2000).








































































1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
 < 30 years old 30-50 years old
 > 50 years old GDP Growth
Average Weekly Wage, by Age
Source: WHIP












































































Average Weekly Wage, by Gender
Source: WHIP








































































1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
Blue-collar White- collar and Cadre
GDP Growth
Average Weekly Wage, by Job Qualification
Source: WHIP








































































1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
North-Western Italy North-Eastern Italy
Central Italy Southern Italy and Islands
GDP Growth
Average Weekly Wage, by Geographical Area
Source: WHIP








































































1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
Manufacturing Construction
Trade Transports and Services
GDP Growth
Average Weekly Wage, by Sector
Source: WHIP








































































1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
 < 20 employees  20-200 employees
 200-1000 employees > 1000 employees
GDP Growth
Average Weekly Wage, by Firm Size
Source: WHIP
4.2 WHIP SAMPLE SELECTION
Following Solon et al.(1994), a two-step procedure is followed to estimate the cyclicality of
real wages. As a ￿rst step, I estimate the aggregate real wage cyclicality starting from an
"unbalanced sample" that mimics aggregate national account statistics; then, in order to avoid
composition bias, I construct a wage statistic based on a "balanced" sample. I expect real
wages to be more procyclical using the balanced sample since the aggregate wage statistic is
supposed to be a⁄ected by composition bias8.
Both the unbalanced and the balanced samples are constructed using WHIP longitudinal
microdata. This approach di⁄ers from the one followed by Solon et al.(1994) since they
compared the estimates of real hourly wage cyclicality from BLS aggregate time series data
to those from PSID longitudinal microdata. The fact that I use a single data source (instead
of two) - and in particular WHIP longitudinal data - to construct both samples has a great
advantage: measurement errors that potentially arise from the use of two di⁄erent sources
using di⁄erent aggregation methods - are directly avoided.
Moreover, as discussed in Section 2, if women and men face di⁄erent wage cyclicalities,
the aggregate real wage statistic could also be a⁄ected by the bias caused by the aggregation
of men and women. To verify it, I repeat the analysis for women, following Solon et al.(1994).
Notice that we require women to respect the same selection criteria (discussed below) used to
identify the male sample. This might imply that the female balanced sample is more selected
than the male one, due to the presence of partecipation issues, but my work is not speci￿cally
devoted to explain women￿ s behavior.
8To control for composition bias there are two alternative procedures: the ￿rst one is estimating equation
(2) starting from a "balanced sample". The second possible procedure is estimating an equation in which one
controls also for time-invariant individual characteristics of the workers (such as race, education). For example,
Solon, Barsky and Parker estimated the following equation: ￿lnWit = ￿1 +￿2t+￿3￿Xt +￿4Yit +vit, where
Yit is the worker￿ s years of work experience in year t: Since we cannot observe such variables we will follow the
￿rst approach.
11First Step: the Unbalanced Sample
The estimation of real wage cyclicality is based on repeated cross sections of white- and
blue-collar workers9 employed in May (to avoid as much as possible patterns of seasonality
in employment), without any further restriction. Outliers, identi￿ed as the 1st and the 99-th
percentiles of the weekly wage￿ s distribution, are removed from the sample. A sample of about
83,000 yearly observations is thus obtained. Tables 1 and 2 show some descriptive statistics
for the WHIP 1998 sample: in particular, it can be noticed that in that year - on average -
workers are 37 years old, they earn around 18,000 euros and they work 46 weeks a year. The
67% of the individuals from the sample are men, the 86% are prime-age workers and the 62%
are blue-collars. Moreover, the 60% of the sample workers work in manufacturing and more
than the 60% in ￿rms located in Northern regions of Italy. As expected, the majority of the
workers is employed in small-size business ￿rms (below 200 workers). With regard to the kind
of worker￿ s contracts, in must be said that the 93% of the cases are permanent worker and
that only 10% are part-time workers.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics, 1998 unbalanced sample
Mean Total Men Women
Age 37.09 37.86 35.53
Work days 270.91 281.76 249.23
Work weeks 46.56 48.40 42.88
Real annual income￿ 18,641 20,397 15,133
Real daily wage￿ 70.55 74.37 62.92
Real weekly wage￿ 393.83 416.00 349.53
Total 83,302 55,515 27,787
Source: WHIP;￿
Wages are de￿ated by NIC (2000 = 100)
9I drop "apprentices" and "managers" from the sample because of their peculiar wage behavior.
12Table 2. Sample composition, 1998 unbalanced sample
Percentage (%) Total Men Women Total Men Women
<30 years old 26.74 24.03 32.17 <20 37.01 34.21 42.61
30-50 years old 59.27 60.18 57.45 20-199 31.01 31.58 29.90
>50 years old 13.99 15.79 10.38 200-999 14.03 14.64 12.81
>=1000 17.94 19.58 14.68
Blue-collar 62.06 69.42 47.35
White-collar and Cadre 37.94 30.58 52.65 North-Western 36.83 35.42 39.65
North-Eastern 25.94 24.66 28.50
Manufacturing 51.99 53.90 48.18 Central Italy 19.23 18.92 19.86
Costruction 7.98 11.12 1.70 South e Islands 18.00 21.00 12.00
Trade 15.66 13.00 20.99
Transports and services 24.37 21.98 29.13 Full-time job 90.53 97.31 77.01
Part-time job 9.47 2.69 22.99
Cig￿ 5.25 6.39 2.97
No cig 94.75 93.61 97.03 Permanent workers 93.50 93.77 92.96
Temporary workers 6.50 6.23 7.04
Total 100 100 100 Total 100 100 100
Source: WHIP;￿
CIG ("Cassa Integrazione Guadagni") denotes whether the employee has received a wage supplement for temporary layo⁄s.
Second Step: the Balanced Sample
To avoid composition bias, I must have for each worker in the sample his/her wage observa-
tion in each year from 1985 to 2003. Thus, I restrict the sample to prime-age men - the group
that is most likely to have positive work hours in every year of the sample period - who are
born between 1944 and 1960. The birth year restriction assures that the sample members are
between the ages of 25 and 59 throughout the sample period to minimize partecipation issues.
Moreover, they are required to be white- and blue-collar workers, employed in May every year
from 1985 to 2003 and to report at least 15 worked days in each year of the sample period.
The resulting sample, made up of 8,936 men, is "balanced" in the sense that each year￿ s
wage information pertains to the exact same workers who meet all of the above criteria. The
same procedure is followed to construct a female balanced sample, made up of 3,142 women.
With respect to Solon et al.(1994), the size of these two samples is considerably greater, as in
their work the male and the female balanced samples are made up of only 355 men and 146
women, respectively. Thus, in my analysis the accuracy of the estimates of the yearly means
is increased. Moreover, let￿ s notice that in Solon et al.(1994), no restriction on worker￿ s job
quali￿cation, business sector, seasonality of employment has been made in constructing the
"balanced sample": it is actually obtained by simply taking the same exact prime-age male
(female) workers with positive labor income each year and at least 100 annual hours of work.
Tables 3 and 4 report the descriptive statistics related to the male and the female balanced
samples in 1998: after comparing them to Tables 1 and 2, one can notice that workers in the
balanced samples - on average - earn and work more than those included in the unbalanced
sample. In particular, the percentage of workers who are white-collars increases; they shift
13from more mobile to less mobile sectors (from construction and commerce to manufacturing
and services sectors) and from small to medium and large size ￿rms. In terms of geographical
area where they work, the percentage of workers in North-Western region increases, while that
in the Mezzogiorno decreases. As expected, the percentage of workers who have a part-time
contract and/or a temporary job sharply decreases.
Table 3. Descriptive statistics, 1998 balanced samples
Mean Men Women
Age 44.81 44.31
Work days 302.85 280.41
Work weeks 51.40 47.56
Real annual income￿ 36,185 27,143
Real daily wage￿ 95.19 79.28
Real weekly wage￿ 538.24 461.46
Total 8,936 3,142
Source: WHIP;￿
Wages are de￿ated by NIC (2000 = 100)
Table 4. Sample composition, 1998 balanced samples
Percentage (%) Men Women Men Women
Men 100 - <20 15.68 24.38
Women - 100 20-199 27.19 28.90
<30 years old - - 200-999 19.87 17.38
30-50 years old 85.26 86.79 >=1000 37.26 29.34
>50 years old 14.74 13.21
Blue-collar 55.00 33.42 North-Western 37.83 45.89
White-collar and Cadre 45.00 66.58 North-Eastern 22.96 25.30
Central Italy 20.66 19.41
Manufacturing 57.63 53.91 South e Islands 18.55 9.39
Costruction 4.71 1.72
Trade 9.33 17.09 Full-time job 99.43 83.45
Transports and services 28.33 27.28 Part-time job 0.57 16.55
Cig 5.12 4.33 Permanent workers 98.56 98.85
No cig 94.88 95.67 Temporary workers 1.44 1.15
Total 100 100 Total 100 100
Source: WHIP
145 ESTIMATION RESULTS
Figure 9 shows Italian weekly wages response to real GDP growth over the 1985-2003 period,
where the wage statistic relates to the unbalanced and then to the male balanced sample:
￿rst of all, real weekly wages from WHIP seem to be procyclical over the period. Secondly,
real weekly wages constructed on the balanced sample look like more procyclical than those
constructed on the unbalanced sample, i.e. there is indication of an increase in real weekly
wage procyclicality after one controls for composition bias.






































1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
Weekly Wage Growth Rate (Unbalanced) Weekly Wage Growth Rate (Balanced)
GDP Growth Rate
Unbalanced and Balanced sample
Weekly Wage Cyclicality, 1985-2003 (Whip)
Source: WHIP
Table 5 shows the results from estimating equation (5), related to the two di⁄erent phases
of the analysis. The ￿rst column reports the estimated elasticity of real weekly wage with
respect to GDP growth rate with the unbalanced sample: it refers to the sample that is sup-
posed to be contaminated by composition and also by the bias that arises from aggregation
of men and women. Regressing real weekly wage growth rate on real GDP growth rate, we
have that the estimated coe¢ cient of ￿lnYt is equal to c ￿3 = 0:474, a statistically signi￿-
cant value implying that an increase in real GDP growth rate by one additional percentage
point determines an increase in real weekly wage growth rate by about 0:5 percentage points.
Therefore, even without controlling for composition bias, Italian aggregate real weekly wages
are estimated to be procyclical over the 1985-2003 period. Since this estimate might be con-
taminated by the composition bias, let￿ s control for it. The second column of Table 5 reports
the results from estimating equation (5) on the male balanced sample. The estimated coe¢ -
cient d ￿3m is equal to 0:806, meaning that Italian real weekly wage are highly procyclical over
the 1985-2003 period, con￿rming what Peng and Siebert (2006) found10. This value is nearly
10Though using di⁄erent approach, data and methods, they found that after controlling for composition bias,
15double compared to the estimates of c ￿3 = 0:474 for the unbalanced sample, representing the
aggregate data subject to composition bias. To test if controlling for composition bias leads
to a statistically signi￿cant increase in the estimated real weekly wage elasticity, a one-sided
t-test is conducted in order to test the null hypothesis against the alternative H1 : d ￿3m > c ￿3.
With such test, the increase in weekly wage procyclicality is estimated to be signi￿cant at
0:07 signi￿cance level, suggesting that, over the 1985-2003 period, real weekly wages of Italian
prime-age men who worked at least 15 days a year each year are considerably more procyclical
than they appear in the aggregate wage statistics a› icted by composition bias.
Remark 1 After controlling for composition bias, real weekly wages are signi￿cantly more
procyclical than they are in the aggregate wage statistics.
Now, let￿ s look at the estimate for the female balanced sample, i.e. d ￿3f = 0:507; di⁄erently
from Solon et al.(1994), I get that the estimate of real wage cyclicality for women is statistically
signi￿cant. Thus, real weekly wages for women are procyclical, too: an increase of one
additional percentage point in GDP growth rate leads to an increase of about 0:5 percentage
points in their real weekly wage growth rates. After controlling for composition bias, the
increase in real weekly wage procyclicality is not statistically signi￿cant: in fact, it is much
smaller than that experienced by men. Therefore, if compared to men￿ s, women￿ s real weekly
wages turn out to be less procyclical, con￿rming the results obtained by Solon et al.(1994),
though here the gender di⁄erence in the estimated procyclicality is not statistically signi￿cant.
This leads to think that if there is an aggregation bias in the aggregate weekly wage statistics,
then it is actually very small. Despite what Solon et al.(1994) found for the US, I estimate
that - over the 1985-2003 period - Italian women experience greater employment ￿ uctuations:
in particular, the cyclical variation in the total work weeks is estimated at 1:15 for women
and only at 0:98 for men. The fact that over the cycle women experience greater employment
￿ uctuations as well as lower wage ￿ uctuations means that women￿ s short-run labor supply is
more elastic than men￿ s. This might be an explanation for the gender di⁄erence in real wage
cyclicality.
Table 5. Estimates of Real Weekly Wage Cyclicality in Italy, 1985-2003










R2 0.18 0.36 0.18
Durbin-Watson 1.90 2.02 2.25
Sources: WHIP, Standard error estimates in brackets, *p<0.10,**p<0.05,***p<0.01
However, according to Solon et al.(1994), to obtain a bias-free measure of aggregate weekly
wage cyclicality, I must estimate the weighted average of ￿3f and ￿3m - shown as the ￿rst
two terms of equation (3). Based on the balanced samples, I found that the true wage
cyclicality for women and men is d ￿3f = 0:507 and d ￿3m = 0:806, respectively. Moreover,
male "stayers in Northern Italy to have high cyclicality of real wages" over the 1994-2001 period, "higher in
fact than the US and the UK".
16from Table 1, I know that - in 1998 - Wf=W = 0:89 and Hf=H = 0:31, where Hf=H is




H = 0:27. According to equation (3), the true aggregate real wage cyclicality is therefore
estimated at 0:73 ￿ (0:806) + 0:27 ￿ (0:507) = 0:725, though the unbalanced sample estimate
displays a dlnWt=dYt of only 0:474. Once one controls for composition bias, the true real
wage procyclicality is estimated to be about 0:7, meaning that an increase of one additional
percentage point in real GDP growth rate leads to an increase of about 0.7 percentage points
in real weekly wage elasticity. Therefore, Italian weekly wages seem to be highly procyclical11.
The implied countercyclical composition bias in the aggregate wage statistic is therefore
￿0:251, that can be decomposed into its two components: the cyclical change in the gender
composition of total work weeks and the cyclical change in the skill composition of each
gender￿ s weeks. By substituting in (Wf ￿Wm)=W = ￿0:17,
dlnHf
dY = 1:15 and dlnHm
dY = 0:98,
the gender composition bias is estimated at ￿0:006. As expected, since the gender di⁄erence
in the estimated procyclicality is not statistically signi￿cant, the gender composition bias
turns out to be very small. Let￿ s notice that, despite what Solon et al.(1994) found, this term
imposes a countercyclical bias as a consequence of the fact that, according to WHIP data,
women are less paid than men and have more cyclically variable weeks over the 1985-2003
period. Calculated as a residual, the skill composition bias is estimated at ￿0:245. The
implied value of ￿ is ￿0:24, denoting a 24 percent within-gender wage gap between cyclically
marginally and nonmarginal weeks. In conclusion, over the 1985-2003 period, Italian real
weekly wage statistics are a⁄ected by composition bias, which mainly arises from the cyclical
change in the skill composition in each gender￿ s work weeks.
Remark 2 Over the 1985-2003 period, Italian weekly wages turn out to be a⁄ected by the
bias arising from the changes in the skill composition of the labor force.
5.1 COMPARISON TO US. ESTIMATES
To compare Italian real wage cyclicality to the US.￿ s, I replicate Solon et al.(1994) work on
US. aggregate data (BLS, Bureau of Labor Statistics) and then on longitudinal microdata
(PSID, Panel Study of Income Dynamics), using both real hourly and weekly wages as wage
measures over the 1976-1996 period12. For comparison to my work, real GDP13 growth rate
- instead of real GNP growth rate - is used as business cycle indicator.
Following Solon et al.(1994), the wage measure initially used is the average hourly (weekly)
earnings of production and nonsupervisory workers on private nonfarm payroll industry14,
generated by the BLS establishment survey. This wage measure includes work on overtime
and second jobs and it is de￿ ated by the implicit GDP de￿ ator. Table 6 shows the estimated
coe¢ cients from OLS estimation of equation (5) of US. real hourly and weekly wage elasticity
to real GDP growth rates over the 1976-96 period. The ￿rst two columns present results when
11Using the unemployment rate and per-capita hours of work the main results are unchanged. Estimates
available upon request.
12PSID data were collected annually through 1997, and biennially starting in 1999. In order to avoid
manipulation of data for missing years (i.e. for 1998, 2000, 2002) I focus on the most recent and available
years, that is from 1976 to 1996, that correspond to the 1977-1997 PSID interviews.
13Real GDP and implicit GDP de￿ ator from Economic Report of the President, 2009, Table B-2 and B-3.
GDP is at 2000 constant price.
14Average hours and earnings of production and nonsupervisory workers on private nonfarm payrolls by
major industry sector, 1964 to date: Employment and Earnings, February 2009, Table B-2.
17Wt is the BLS average hourly and weekly wage, respectively. According to BLS aggregate
wage statistics, the hourly wage procyclicality is estimated at 0:15515, whereas the weekly
wage procyclicality is estimated at 0:361, statistically signi￿cant values that denote a weak
procyclical response of real wages to economic ￿ uctuations.
Table 6. Estimates of Real Hourly and Weekly Wage Cyclicality in the US, 1976-96
BLS-aggregated1 Male Balanced Sample2 Female Balanced Sample2
Cycle regressor:
￿lnYt













R2 0.28 0.68 0.32 0.32 0.03 0.05
Durbin-Watson 0.87 0.92 2.55 2.77 3.25 2.99
Sources: 1BLS and 2PSID. Male balanced sample: 255 men; female balanced sample: 156 women,*p<0.10,**p<0.05,***p<0.01
Since these estimates are supposed to be contaminated by the composition bias, I proceed to
estimate US. real wage elasticity to GDP growth starting from a male and a female balanced
samples, drawn from the 1977-1997 cross-year family-individual level data ￿les of the national
longitudinal survey PSID. They collect yearly data on annual labor income, work hours and
work weeks of each individual, which allow us to compute his hourly (weekly) wage as the
ratio of his annual labor income to his annual work hours (weeks)16. Like the BLS average
wage statistics, it includes work on overtime and second jobs and it is de￿ ated by the implicit
GDP de￿ ator.
Like Solon et al.(1994), the male balanced sample is contructed by restricting the PSID
data to men aged between 25 and 59 troughout the period, who were household heads every
year of the sample period and who reported positive labor income and at least 100 hours of
work each year: it contains 255 individuals, whereas the female balanced sample (made up
of women who were household heads or spouses every year of the sample period and who
are required to meet all the other above criteria) contains 156 individuals in each year of the
1976-96 period.
Based on the male balanced sample, I ￿nd that the real hourly and weekly wage elasticities
to real GDP growth are respectively estimated at d ￿3m = 0:56817 and d ￿3m = 0:658, as shown
by the third and the fourth columns of Table 6. If compared with the corresponding BLS
estimates, the increase in real wage procyclicality is statistically signi￿cant with p-value <
0.01 after one controls for composition bias. Now, let￿ s look at the last two columns of Table 6,
related to the female balanced sample: for women, real hourly and weekly wage cyclicalities
are respectively estimated at d ￿3f = 0:320 and d ￿3f = 0:358. As the estimates for women
are not statistically signi￿cant - con￿rming what Solon et al.(1994) found over the 1967-87
period, real wages are less procyclical for women than for men18. Notice that, as expected,
15Solon et al.(1994) estimated the hourly wage cyclicality at 0.293 (s.e. 0.077) for the 1967-87 period.
16Observations with "major assignements" imputed for labor income or work hours are excluded from the
sample.
17Solon et al.(1994) estimated the hourly wage cyclicality at 0.617 (s.e. 0.165) for the 1967-87 period.
18For the 1967-87 period, I estimated real hourly wage elasticity to GDP growth to be: 0.323 (s.e.=0.120)
from BLS and 0.629 (s.e.=0.158) from PSID male balanced sample. The estimated real weekly wage elasticity to
18real weekly wage turns out be more procyclical than hourly wage over the same business cycle:
as already stated in Section 4, it might be due to the fact that over the cycle work hours are
more cyclically variable than work weeks. Nevertheless, the greater procyclicality shown by
real weekly wage is statistically signi￿cant (with p-value < 0.05) only for the BLS aggregate
wage statistics, meaning that after controlling for composition bias the two wage measures
give the same inferencial results.
To get a free-bias measure of US. real wage elasticity to real GDP growth over the 1976-96
period, let￿ s estimate the weighted average of ￿3f and ￿3m - shown as the ￿rst two terms of





Thus, the true real hourly wage cyclicality is estimated to be equal to 0:484, though the
unbalanced sample estimate displays a dlnWt=dYt of only 0:155. Therefore, the resulting
countercyclical composition bias in the aggregate wage statistic turns out to be estimated at
￿0:329. With regard to the true real weekly wage procyclicality20, it must be said that it is
estimated around 0:56021, whereas the aggregate BLS wage statistics show that dlnWt=dYt
GDP growth rate are: 0.539 (s.e.=0.122) from BLS and 0.697 (s.e.=0.165) from PSID male balanced sample.
Hence, using real GDP instead of real GNP as business cycle indicator, the estimates are not signi￿cantly
di⁄erent from those obtained by Solon et al.(1994). Notice that the procyclicality shown by the aggregate real
wages from BLS is signi￿cantly greater in 1967-87 than in 1976-96 period.
19Median hourly earnings of wage and salary workers paid hourly rates in constant (2000) dollars by sex
and age, 1979-2000 annual averages: "Highlights of Women￿ s Earnings in 2000", BLS, Report 952, Table 16.
Employed persons by full- and part-time status and sex, 1970-2004 annual averages, Table 20: Women in
the Labor Force: a Databook, BLS, May 2005, Report 985. Average weekly hours at work in all industries
and in nonagricultural industries by sex, 1976-2004 annual averages, Table 21: Women in the Labor Force: a
Databook, BLS, May 2005, Report 985.
20Median usual weekly earnings of full-time wage and salary workers in constant (2000) dollars by sex and
age, 1979-2000 annual averages, Table 13: "Highlights of Women￿ s Earnings in 2000", BLS, Report 952.
21As data on number of worked weeks are not available from PSID, the true real weekly wage procyclicality
is therefore computed by using the share of work hours as a proxy of the share of work weeks.
19is equal to 0:361, implying a countercyclical composition bias of ￿0:199.






































1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Year
Weekly Wage Growth Rate (Unbalanced) Weekly Wage Growth Rate (Balanced)
GDP Growth Rate
Weekly Wage Cyclicality, Usa (1976-1996)
Source: Economic Report of the President 2009, Employment and Earnings, Feb. 2009, PSID.
Let￿ s compare the estimates for Italian and US. real weekly wage response to economic
￿ uctuations: if the second row of Table 6 is compared to Table 5, it turns out that, even if
related to di⁄erent business cycles, the cyclicalities of Italian and US. real weekly wage to
economic ￿ uctuations are of similar magnitude and not statistically di⁄erent, though after
controlling for composition bias, the increase in real weekly wage procyclicality experienced
by men is greater in the US. Moreover, although real wages are less procyclical for women
than for men in both countries, the gender di⁄erence in the real wage cyclicality is statistically
signi￿cant only with the US. estimates.
Remark 3 Even if related to di⁄erent business cycles, the estimates of Italian and US.￿ s real
wage procyclicality are of similar magnitude and not statistically signi￿cantly di⁄erent.
Remark 4 However, after controlling for composition bias, the US. estimates show a greater
increase in real weekly wage procyclicality and a signi￿cant gender di⁄erence in real wage
cyclicality.
206 ANALYSIS OF ROBUSTNESS
6.1 IMPOSING A RESTRICTION ON WORKED DAYS
In Solon et al.(1994)￿ s work, workers in the balanced sample were required to work at least
100 hours in each year of the 1967-1987 period. Here, as the actual number of hours worked
by an employee is not observed, I impose a restriction on the number of actual worked days.
So far, I have focused on workers who reported at least 15 work days.
What would happen to weekly wage cyclicality if the number of days worked by the
individuals in the balanced sample was imposed to be greater?
Let￿ s consider those who worked at least 100 days per year (the 75% of the female balanced
sample and the 87% of the male balanced sample), then let￿ s focus on those who worked at least
250 days per year (31% of female balanced sample and 46.5% of the male balanced sample)
and ￿nally those who worked at least 300 days per year ( 17% of the female balanced sample
and 26% of the male balanced sample). Table 7 shows that real weekly wage procyclicality
decreases when the number of required minimum work days increases. This result holds both
for the male and the female balanced sample. Again, the greater procyclicality of men￿ s real
wage with respect to women￿ s is con￿rmed to be not statistically signi￿cant.
Remark 5 As the number of minimum required work days increases, real weekly wage pro-
cyclicality decreases.
The reason might be the following: with such restrictions I am removing from the sample
workers with higher level of job mobility, whose wage changes are larger than those within-job.
One of the explanations for that is that employers use job-changes as a means of adjusting
wages to the business cycle22. Therefore, what happens is that the estimated procyclicality
of the remaining less mobile workers is therefore diminished.
Table 7. Estimates of Real Weekly Wage Cyclicality, Restriction on Worked Days, balanced samples,1985-2003
Men Balanced Sample Women Balanced Sample
Cycle regressor:
￿lnYt



















R2 0.36 0.35 0.34 0.30 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.13
Durbin-Watson 2.02 2.12 2.22 2.34 2.25 2.24 2.04 2.56
Sources: WHIP, Standard error estimates in brackets, *p<0.10,**p<0.05,***p<0.01
22Devereux and Hart (2006).
217 STRUCTURAL BREAK
So far, I got that Italian real weekly wages have been highly procyclical over the 1985-2003
period. Nevertheless, the 1985-2003 period has been charachterized by institutional reforms
that might have a⁄ected Italian real wage response to economic ￿ uctuations.
On the one side, some of these reforms were directly devoted to introduce greater ￿ exibility
to the Italian wage structure: the automatic mechanism (known as scala mobile system)
through which Italian nominal wages were indexed to prices - was abolished in 1992. The
purchasing power of wages is now set according to the Government￿ s targeted rate of in￿ ation,
that, despite the aim of the reform, had the consequence of ￿ attening out the wage dynamics23.
In addition to that, a new bargaining system was introduced by the Income Policy Agree-
ment (IPA) in July 1993. Beside the strongly centralized wage-setting bargaining arrange-
ments - an additional bargaining level - regional or ￿rm level - has been introduced; it is mainly
devoted to the distribution of additional (top-up) components, i.e. wages over and above the
industry-wide contractual wage, set according to ￿rms￿performance and local conditions.
Despite the decentralized top-up components became more responsive to local unemployment
after 199324, the power of central wage-setting in Italy has still remained high, the collective
bargaining coverage being more than 80%.
On the other hand, later reforms were directly devoted to introduce greater ￿ exibility
to the "quantity" side of the labor market: new non-standard contracts (free lance/quasi
subordinate & temporary agency workers jobs) were introduced in 1997 with the so-called
Pacchetto Treu and in 2001 there was the liberalization of ￿xed term contracts. Leombruni
(2008) found that after 1997 there has been a sharp increase in the Italian gwt (gross worker
turnover) after the introduction of the new contracts brought by the Pacchetto Treu-reform.
Here, my aim is to verify if Italian real wage cyclicality has been a⁄ected by these insti-
tutional changes. A test has been conducted in order to determine if there was a structural
break in Italian real weekly wage cyclicality over the 1985-2003 period.
In particular, I run the following speci￿cation:
￿lnWt = ￿3 + ￿3t + ￿3￿lnYt + ￿30d + ￿30dt + ￿30d￿lnYt + vt (6)
where d is a dummy variable equal to 0 for period 1 and equal to 1 for period 2. The model
is equivalent to estimating two separate models for the two periods.
Then, the coe¢ cients ￿30, ￿30 and ￿30 are tested to be jointly equal to zero: the resulting
test statistic is distributed as a F(k;N1 + N2 ￿ 2k), where k is the number of the estimated
parameters (k = 3 in our case), N1 and N2 are the number of observations in the two periods.
Rejection of the null hypothesis means that the two periods do not share the same intercept,
slope and trend, so there is a structural break in real weekly wage cyclicality.
Di⁄erent alternatives have been tested on the unbalanced sample and the null hypothesis
of non existence of a structural break in the time series is rejected when I check for the period
before and after the year 1997. However, when the same test is run on the male balanced
sample, I ￿nd that there is weak evidence of a structural break in 1997.
Table 8 presents the results from estimating equation (6) on the unbalanced and the male
balanced samples when d = 0 for the period before 1997 (and d = 1 for the period after 1997).
23Devicienti, Maida and Pacelli (2008)
24Devicienti, Maida and Pacelli (2008).
22Table 8. Estimates of Structural Break in Weekly Wage Cyclicality, Unbalanced and Male Balanced sample































Sources: WHIP, Standard error estimates in brackets, *p<0.10,**p<0.05,***p<0.01
Let￿ s look at the ￿rst column of Table 8, that relates to the unbalanced sample: the result
of the test coe¢ cients against 0 in the pooled speci￿cation is an F-test statistic equal to 5:15,
distributed as F(3;12), with critical value 3:49 at 5% signi￿cance level. There is a statistically
signi￿cant reduction in Italian real wage cyclicality after ￿ exibility on the "quantity" side of
the labor market has been increased by the Treu￿ s reform: before 1997, the estimated real
weekly wage procyclicality is 0:645, whereas, after that year, it turns out to be not signi￿cantly
di⁄erent from zero.
Why do I ￿nd a "reduction" in real weekly wage cyclicality after 1997? As already stated,
it has been empirically found that the introduction of new-￿ exible contracts in 1997 led to an
increase in Italian gwt. Thus, it might be the case that - as a consequence of the increase in the
￿ exibility on the "quantity" side of the labor market - the ￿ exibility on the "price" side has
diminished. The 1997 reform might have given a new opportunity to ￿rms to recur to these
new contracts to adjust their labor demand needs. If this is true, they could have a⁄ected the
way in which Italian labor market adjusts to economic ￿ uctuations: it is reasonable to think
that now, labor market adjustments could more often/easily occur through "quantity" rather
than through "price" (i.e. wage) adjustments. Hence, the reduction in real wage elasticity
could be due to the fact that after 1997 business cycle ￿ uctuations a⁄ect - ￿rst of all - the
quantity side. Moreover, we know that after 1993, the 80% of labor contracts are set according
to the Government￿ s targeted rate of in￿ ation, thus inducing a general real wage ￿ attening
(as also documented in Figure 9). Though a structural break in 1993 has not been detected
(suggesting that in my analysis the 1993 reforms do not have, per se, a measurable e⁄ect on
real wage cyclical behavior), the sum of the e⁄ects brought by the 1993 and by the Treu￿ s
reforms might be responsible for the reduction in Italian real wage dynamics after 1997.
However, after controlling for composition bias the existence of a signi￿cant structural
break in 1997 is found to be weaker. As the second column of Table 8 shows, the estimated
real weekly wage procyclicality decreases from 1:061 to 0:230, a statistically signi￿cant value
23that denotes mild procyclicality. The result of the test is equal to F(3;12) = 3:18, with critical
value 2:60 at 10% signi￿cance level. Hence, balanced sample workers experienced a signi￿cant
but weaker structural break in their real weekly wage cyclicality. The reason might be the
following: di⁄erently from those in the unbalanced sample, balanced sample workers turn out
not to be a⁄ected by the 1997 introduction of new non-standard contracts as they are long-
tenured workers, by construction. In fact, after the Treu￿ s reform, the presence of temporary
workers in the male balanced sample is lower (1.4% in 1998) than in the unbalanced sample
(6.50% in 1998), where it starts increasing over time. Therefore, the slight decline in the wage
cyclicality of balanced sample workers might be simply due to the e⁄ects of the 1993 reforms.
248 CONCLUSIONS
In this work, I estimate Italian real weekly wage cyclicality over the 1985-2003 period, by using
longitudinal data from WHIP. To do so, as discussed in Section 2, I followed the strategy
proposed by Stockman (1983), who proved that the aggregate real wage statistics - commonly
used to measure real wage cyclicality - are a⁄ected by a "composition bias", i.e. a bias
that might arise from the aggregation of low and high-wage groups of workers, experiencing
di⁄erent hours share￿ s cyclicality over the business cycle. In fact, they give more weight to
low-skilled workers during expansion than during recession, thus inducing a countercyclical
bias in the estimate of real wage￿ s cyclicality. After controlling for composition bias, real wages
turn out to be considerably more procyclical than indicated by aggregate time series, that
show near-noncyclicality for the same period. Moreover, the true procyclicality of real wages
might be underestimated by the aggregation of women and men, who experienced di⁄erent
wage cyclicalities, as pointed out by Solon, Barsky and Parker in 1994. The ￿ndings of real
wage procyclicality has very important implications on the extent of short-run labor-supply
curve￿ s elasticity: if real wages are actually procyclical over the business cycle, the resulting
estimated elasticity of the labor-supply curve is therefore diminished, con￿rming micro-level
results.
As shown by Table 5, I ￿nd that in Italy, real weekly wages are procyclical over the 1985-
2003 period: an increase of one additional percentage point in real GDP growth rate leads
to an increase of about 0:47 percentage points in real weekly wage elasticity. However, after
controlling for composition bias, real weekly wages are considerably more procyclical than they
appear in the aggregate wage statistics a› icted by composition bias. In fact, the estimated
procyclicality becomes equal to 0:80: the increase in real wage procyclicality is estimated to
be signi￿cant at 0:07 signi￿cance level.
These results are consistent with Solon et al.(1994)￿ s ￿ndings for the US: they estimate
that, after controlling for composition bias, real hourly wage cyclicality has increased from
0:29 up to 0:62 over the 1967-87 period. In order to compare US. to Italian estimates, I
replicate their work by using real weekly wage as a wage measure. As Table 6 shows, after
controlling for composition bias, US. weekly wage procyclicality is estimated to be about 0:66
for 1976-96 period, whereas the aggregate wage statistic displays a real wage elasticity of only
0:36. Though after controlling for composition bias the increase in real weekly wage cyclicality
is higher in the US. than in Italy, Italian and US. real weekly wage responses to economic
￿ uctuations turn out to be of similar magnitude and not statistically signi￿cantly di⁄erent.
Secondly, I ￿nd real weekly wages to be signi￿cantly more procyclical for men than for women
only in the US.
Moreover, as discussed in Section 6, the result of high procyclicality shown by Italian
real weekly wages is robust to di⁄erences in the number of minimum days worked by the
individuals. I also ￿nd that real weekly wage procyclicality experienced by men and women
decreases when I focus only on those who work "hard" (i.e. almost 300 days a year): they
are presumibly workers with a low level of job mobility, whose wages therefore ￿ uctuate less
than those of job-movers.
Even if real weekly wages turn out to be strongly procyclical over the 1985-2003 period,
a statistically signi￿cant reduction in Italian real weekly wage procyclicality is detected in
1997, when testing for structural breaks in the time series. It might be interpreted as the
consequence of two overlapping e⁄ects: on the one hand, after 1993, wages at the national
25bargaining level are set according to the Government￿ s targeted rate of in￿ ation, with the
consequence of ￿ attening out the wage dynamics. On the other hand, the 1997 introduction of
new non-standard labor contracts (free lance/quasi subordinate & temporary agency workers
jobs) brought by the Pacchetto Treu led to an increase in the ￿ exibility of the "quantity" side of
the labor market, thus presumably reducing the ￿ exibility on the "price" side. If conditioned
to balanced sample workers, the 1997 structural break in real weekly wage procyclicality
is signi￿cant but weaker: focusing on long-tenured workers, the e⁄ect of the Treu￿ s reform
disappears as those with new non-standard contracts are not included in this sample, by
construction.
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